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With rapid urbanization and fast growth of income, China sees worsening traffic 
congestion in all major cities.  Previous studies on traffic congestion have emphasized on the 
supply-side instruments, such as expanding road capacity and improving traffic management.  
However, transportation researchers have identified three paradoxes in which the usual remedy 
for congestion – expanding the road system – is ineffective or even counterproductive.  This 
paper has two purposes.  One is to present three paradoxes of traffic flow in their general forms.  
The other is to give the economics of congestion pricing.  For the latter, the paper will first 
address traffic externalities, then propose pricing options, and finally discuss applications.   
Unlike most early studies, this paper emphasizes on the demand-side policies by examining the 
behavior of commuters and using pricing mechanism. 
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  11. Introduction 
Since 1990, China has been experiencing rapid urbanization and fast income growth, with 
its urban population increasing from 301.95 million in 1990 to 542.83 million in 2004 and real 
per capita GDP increasing from 5233 RMB to 10561 RMB, respectively (NBSC, 2005).   One 
consequence is a dramatic growth of private vehicles.  In 1990, China had 5,502,648 private 
vehicles.  This number became 31,596,629 in 2005, 5.47 fold increasing in 15 years. The growth 
of private vehicles in major cities is even faster.  For example, Beijing and Shanghai increased 
6.75 and 6.44 fold, respectively during the same period.  No question, China sees severe traffic 
congestion on its urban roads, which not only wastes tremendous amount of time of urban 
commuters but also causes many more fatal traffic accidents.   Because of traffic accidents, 
China lost 48,271 and 98,738 lives in 1990 and 2005, respectively (SDPC, 2001-2007).   
Like other countries, China mostly depends on supply-side policies to mitigate urban 
congestion, such as through expanding network capacity and improving traffic management.  For 
instance, Beijing has restricted odd and even plate number vehicles for inner city on even and 
odd dates since June 17, 2007; Shanghai constructs light transit system which covers most of the 
city area; Beijing builds more subways; and many cities increase the number of buses in services. 
Unfortunately, supply-side policies are not effective to reduce urban traffic congestion because 
urban commuting is subject to the theory of “triple convergences.”  As Downs (2004) observed, 
in response to a capacity addition, three immediate effects occur. First, drivers using alternative 
routes begin to use the expanded roads.  Second, those previously traveling during off-peak times 
(either immediately before or after the peak) shift to the peak (rescheduling behavior as defined 
previously). Third, public transport users shift to driving their vehicles.  Because of the triple 
convergences and a potential huge induced demand, it is impossible to remove peak-hour 
  2congestion from highways and roads by creating more road capacity.   
In fact, transportation researchers have identified three traffic paradoxes showing that 
expanding a road system as a remedy to congestion is not only ineffective but also 
counterproductive under some conditions (Murchland, 1970; Arnott and Small, 1994; Braess et 
al., 2005).  Specifically, the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox states that adding extra road capacity 
to a road does not reduce travel time.  The Downs-Thomson paradox states that the equilibrium 
speed of car traffic on the road network is determined by the average door-to-door speed of 
equivalent journeys by public transport.  It follows that increasing road capacity can actually 
make overall congestion on the road worse.  The Braess paradox states that adding extra capacity 
to a network, when the moving entities selfishly choose their route, can in some cases reduce 
overall performance and increase the total commuting time. 
Traffic paradoxes exist because commuting generates negative externalities as a vehicle 
slows down all cars behind and adds to air pollution.  Because of these negative externalities, in 
market equilibrium, drivers tend to drive more and thus there are more vehicles on roads, causing 
more congestion.  In order to correct this market failure, a toll or road price needs to be levied on 
vehicles, so that traffic externality can be internalized and a social optimization will be reached.  
Therefore, it could be more effective to implement demand-side remedies to mitigate traffic 
congestion, because price mechanism not only affects driver’s commuting behavior but also 
generates toll revenue for governments to provide better transportation network. 
In this paper, by examining three traffic paradoxes, we will first prove that expanding a 
road system as a remedy to congestion is not only ineffective but often counterproductive.  We 
then show that the paradoxes can be solved if congestion pricing is implemented.  Our main 
contribution is to prove the three paradoxes and give social optimal solutions in their general 
  3forms.  To our knowledge, no previous study has attempted to do so, except Hartman (2007) 
which is for the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox only.  We hope that our theoretical analysis will 
shed important lights on transportation policy-making in China and other countries. 
 
2. Traffic Paradoxes 
This section discusses three traffic paradoxes, namely the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox, 
the Downs-Thomson paradox, and the Braess paradox.  They are paradoxes because expanding a 
road system as a remedy to congestion is not only ineffective but also counterproductive under 
some conditions.  We will attempt to show these paradoxes in general cases in terms of their 
parameters. 
A.  The Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox 
The Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox states that adding extra road capacity to a road does 
not reduce travel time.  This occurs because traffic may simply shift to the upgraded road from 
the other, making the upgraded road more congested.  




In Figure 1, we assume that a bridge is added to the road system from A to B and the 
highway is always uncongested.  The total travel flow is F, which is distributed between the 
  4bridge ( ) and the highway ( ).  The average travel time on the bridge ( ) is a linear function 
of the flow-to-capacity ratio and the average travel time on the uncongested highway ( ) is a 
constant. Hence, we have  
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where a, b, and d are positive parameters with d > a;   is the traffic capacity of the bridge.  In 
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meaning that increasing the bridge capacity will attract more drivers to use the bridge. However,  
  ,   d T T = = 2 1
indicating that increasing the bridge capacity will not reduce travel time.  Therefore, the Pigou-




, because expanding the 
bridge will only shift travelers to the bridge but not reduce travel time. The Pigou-Knight-Downs 
paradox reveals that bride expansion will not reduce travel time as long as there is at least one 
person or car using the uncongested highway.  Therefore, under the condition, bridge expansion 
can not be justified for time saving.   
Using a=10, b=10, d=15, and F=1,000, Arnott and Small (1994) showed that the average 
travel time remains at 15 even if the bridge capacity continues to increase until it reaches 2,000, 
  5which is twice as big as the total traffic volume, numerically proving the above Pigou-Knight-
Downs paradox.  
 
B.  The Downs-Thomson Paradox 
The Downs-Thomson paradox states that the equilibrium speed of car traffic on the road 
network is determined by the average door-to-door speed of equivalent journeys by public 
transport.  It follows that increasing road capacity can actually make overall congestion on the 
road worse. This occurs when the shift from public transport causes a disinvestment in the mode 
such that the operator either reduces frequency of service or raises fares to cover costs. This 
shifts additional passengers into cars. Ultimately, congestion on the road gets worse and the total 
commuting time increases. 
  6Figure 2: The Downs-Thomson Paradox 
Private car route 
Public transit route 
 
In Figure 2, two routes connect A and B. One is private car route, with a traffic flow of 
.  The other is a public transit route, with a number of passengers of  .  We assume that the 
average travel time on the private car route  ( ) is a linear function of the flow-to-capacity ratio 
and the average travel time on the public transit route ( ) has a scale effect. Hence, we have  
1 F 2 F
1 T
2 T
  ;        ;      ; 
where a, b, d, and e are positive parameters with d > a;   is the traffic capacity of the private car 
route; and e tells the scale effect of the public transit.  In equilibrium,  
  .  
We get   
  ,     and    .   
At the boundary of   , we obtain the boundary condition for   
   
When  , 
    > 0, because  . 
Therefore, increasing the traffic capacity of the private car route within the range of   
will increase traveling time on both routes ( ), proving the Downs-Thomson paradox.  The 
Downs-Thomson paradox suggests that highway expansion will be counterproductive under the 
  7condition that there is at least one person using public transit that exhibits economic scale.  The 
underlined logic behind this is the highway expansion will improve capacity, which in turn 
attracts more users from transit riders.  A reduction in transit ridership will cause less frequency 
in transit operation and then longer commuting times for its users.   
Using a=10, b=10, e=300, d=20, and F=1,000, Arnott and Small (1994) found that the 
average travel time increases from 17.27 to 18.89 when the capacity of highway rises from 250 
to 750, numerically proving the above Downs-Thomson paradox. 
 
C.  The Braess Paradox 
The Braess' paradox states that adding extra capacity to a network, when the moving 
entities selfishly choose their route, can in some cases reduce overall performance and increase 
the total commuting time. 








In Figure 3, two routes connect A and B before an uncongested causeway is added 
between U and W (hence  =0), namely AUB and AWB and with traffic flow of   and  , 
respectively.  The segments of AU and WB are congested and travel time on them increases 
proportionally with traffic flow.  The segments of UB and AW are uncongested and travel time 
on them is assumed to be a constant (a). Hence, we have 
  ;       ;       ;  
where a and e are positive parameters. In equilibrium,  
  .  
which gives traffic flow on each route (AUB or AWB) half of the total traffic flow and the 
average travel time without the causeway 
  9   . 
With the causeway added between U and W, three routes connect A and B, namely AUB, 
AUWB, and AWB (a fourth route of AWUB would be impractical).  In this case, the traffic flow 
on AU is   the traffic flow on WB is   and the traffic flow on the causeway is  . 
Travel time on the uncongested causeway is assumed to be a constant (k,  with k < a).  In 
equilibrium,  
     
where  
   ;     ;   ; 
     
We get the average travel time with the causeway and traffic flow distribution, 
    
   ae F ke F F − + = = 2 1 ;  F ke ae F − − = 2 2 3  
Therefore, 
    =    
A traffic paradox exists if    In this case,    meaning that adding the 
causeway between U and W will increase the average commute time.  In other words, expanding 
capacity to a network can in some cases will reduce overall performance and increase the total 
commuting time.  The Braess paradox implies that construction of new uncongested highway 
segment(s) connecting congested highways will not alienate overall traffic times  this newly 
constructed highway attracts users from uncongested highways. 
Using a=20, k=10, e=100, and F=1,500, Arnott and Small (1994) found that the average 
  10travel time increases from 27.5 without a causeway to 30 with a causeway, proving the Braess 
traffic paradox. 
 
3. Congestion Pricing as a Resolution to Traffic Paradoxes 
  In the above analysis, commuters make route and modal choices based on their 
commuting time, i.e, in equilibrium, the average commuting time is the same for different routes 
or modals.  Put it differently, commuters ignore how much delay they cause on other travelers 
but only pay attention to how long it takes them to commute.  Therefore, the equilibrium 
numbers of commuters for routes and modals are not social optimal.  This can be shown 
theoretically below. 
For each route or modal, let V be the traffic volume and t be the average commuting time.  







SC + = + = =
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V ). If the average commuting time increases with the number of commuters, like the case 
on congested urban roads, EC is positive and social marginal cost (SC) will be higher than the 
private average cost (t).  Consequently, the equilibrium travel volume (VE) will be larger than the 
social optimal traffic volume (VO), i.e., too many commuters are on the roads.  The former is 
determined based on the private average cost while the latter is calculated based on the social 
marginal cost, as shown in Figure 4.   If the average commuting time decreases with the number 
of commuters, like the case of public transit, EC is negative and social marginal cost (SC) will be 
lower than the private average cost (t).  Consequently, the equilibrium travel volume (VE) will be 
less than the social optimal traffic volume (VO), i.e., too few passengers are using public transit.  
  11If the number of commuters does not affect the average commuting time, no congestion exists 
and externality disappears. 
 
Figure 4: Economics of Congestion Pricing 
V0 VE
 
To reach social optimization, externality should be internalized.  In the case of congested 
urban roads, this suggests a toll of 
dV
dt
V  be charged on commuters.  Because
dV
dt
V  depends on 
traffic volume, the toll should be higher for more congested roads or periods than the one for less 
congested roads or periods.   The optimal toll revenue equals to 
dV
dt




Many studies have discussed the theory and practice of congestion pricing.  Evans (1992) 
examined when congestion pricing is a good policy.  Giuliano (1992) assessed the political 
acceptability of congestion pricing.  Small (1992, 1993) investigated toll revenues and 
spendings.  Often, the public perceives toll simply as tax and commuters disliked the toll because 
  12they find it coercive, in that they have few if any practical alternatives to paying the toll. 
Congestion pricing thus is considered as an economists’ dream but politicians’ nightmare. 
However, in recent years, congestion pricing is becoming more popular in practice and 
receiving more public support.  It also has been implemented in many cities in different 
countries.  The best-known example of a successful congestion pricing program is the Area 
Licensing Scheme in Singapore where vehicles that wish to enter the central business district 
during peak hours must purchase a license (Watson and Holland, 1978; Phang and Toh, 2004; 
Decorla-Souza, 2006).  In Spring 1998, the city shifted to a fully automated electronic charging 
system, with in-vehicle devices allowing payment by smart card, and enforcement using cameras 
and license plate reading equipment.  The system has reduced traffic by 13 percent and increased 
vehicle speed by 22 percent.  On February 17, 2003, London implemented a plan for using road 
pricing to combat congestion in central London.  The scheme involves a standard per-day charge 
for vehicles traveling within a zone bounded by an inner ring road.  The congestion charge, 
together with improvements in public transit financed with revenues from the charging system, 
led to a 15 percent reduction in traffic in central London.  Travel delays have been reduced by 30 
percent.  Average traffic speed increased 37 percent.  Excess waiting time on buses has fallen by 
around one-third (Decorla-Souza, 2006; Litman, 2006).  In the first half year of 2006, Stockholm 
took a trial on congestion pricing, which resulted in 22 percent drop in vehicle trips and 9 percent 
increase in ridership on inner-city bus routes.  Traffic accidents involving injuries fell by 5 to 10 
percent.  Exhaust emissions decreased by 14 percent in the inner-city.  Residents of the City of 
Stockholm voted for continuation of the system in a referendum on September 17, 2006.  The 
system was reinstated in 2007 (Decorla-Souza, 2006).  Congestion pricing also has been 
implemented in the USA.  Examples include the HOT lanes on I-15 in San Diego, California and 
  13the bridge pricing in Lee County, Florida, both started in 1998.  A better known example is the 
four variably-priced express lanes in the median of the State Route 91 Freeway in Southern 
California. Opened in December 1995, priced express lane each carry almost twice as many 
vehicles per lane than the free lanes during the peak hours, because of the effect of severe 
congestion on vehicle throughout in the free lanes (Harrington et al., 1998; Decorla-Souza, 
2006). 
In the following discussion, we will determine traffic volumes for routes and modals by 
minimizing the social total cost.  If we let the social marginal cost be the same for different 
routes, the same solutions will be obtained.  For all three traffic paradoxes discussed in section 2, 
our solutions show that increasing traffic capacity will always decrease the social total cost.  
Therefore, these paradoxes disappear if commuting externality is internalized and an optimal 
congestion pricing is implemented. 
 
A.  The Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox 
As specified earlier for the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox, we have  
  ;        ;      ; 
where a, b, and d are positive parameters with d > a;   is the traffic capacity of the bridge.  
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Minimizing the total cost with respect to F1, we get the following social optimal traffic 
flow on the bridge, the social total cost, and the relationship between the social total cost and the 































The above solutions give two conclusions.  First, the social optimal travel flow is the half 
of the equilibrium flow derived in section 2, showing that the bridge will be over-used in 
equilibrium when travelers choose routes based their own private cost.   Second, the total travel 
cost decreases with the bridge capacity.  Hence, the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox disappears when traffic 
flows are distributed by minimizing the social total cost. 
At the social optimum, the difference between the social marginal cost and the average 
private cost, i.e., the traffic externality, will be bF1/C1 evaluated at the social optimal traffic flow.  
This determines the optimal toll and toll revenue on the bridge, which equal to 
2










Therefore, to reach a social optimal solution and solve the Pigou-Knight-Downs traffic paradox, 
a toll of (d-a)/2 should be charged on every commuter who is using the bridge.  By charging such 
a toll, travel externality will be internalized and some of the commuters will be discouraged to 
use the bridge, making the road network efficient. 
 
B.  The Downs-Thomson paradox 
As specified earlier for the Downs-Thomson paradox, we have  
  15;        ;      ; 
where a, b, d, and e are positive parameters with d > a;   is the traffic capacity of the private car 
route; and e tells the scale effect of the public transit.  Accordingly, the total cost can be written 
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Minimizing the total cost with respect to F1, we get the following social optimal travel 
flow on the bridge, the social total cost, and the relationship between the social total cost and the 
capacity of the private car route. 
1
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The above solutions give two conclusions.  First, because d > a, we can easily prove that 
the social optimal travel flow on the private car route is smaller than the equilibrium flow 
derived in section 2, showing that the private car route will be over-used if route choices are 
made based on private cost.   Second, the total travel cost decreases with the capacity of the private car 
route.  Hence, the Downs-Thomson paradox disappears when traffic flows are distributed by minimizing 
the social total cost. 
At the social optimum, the difference between the social marginal cost and the average 
private cost, i.e., the traffic externality, will be bF1/C1 evaluated at the social optimal traffic flow.  
This determines the optimal toll and toll revenue on the private car route, which equal to 
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Therefore, to reach a social optimal solution and solve the Downs-Thomson traffic paradox, a 
toll of the above amount should be charged on every commuter who is using the private car 
route.  By charging such a toll, travel externality will be internalized and some of the commuters 
will be discouraged to use the private car route, making the transportation system efficient. 
 
  C. Baress paradox 
Before the causeway is added, each route (AUB or AWB) sees half of the total traffic 
flow, and the total social cost is  
e
F
aF TC seway withoutcau 2
2
+ =  
With the causeway added, as specified earlier, we have  
   ;     ;   ; 
     


























( + + − + − − + − + = + + =  
Minimizing the total cost with respect to F1 and F2, we get the following social optimal 
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Comparing with the equilibrium traffic flows determined by using the average private cost, F3 is 
smaller under the social optimization, suggesting that fewer travelers are using the causeway and 
the congested segments at the both ends.  Also, we can prove that the total social cost will be 
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Therefore, when in social optimal solutions, adding causeway will reduce the total travel cost, 
indicating that the Braess paradox is solved. 
At the social optimum, the difference between the social marginal cost and the average 
private cost, i.e., the traffic externality, will be (F1+F3)/e on AU and (F2+F3)/e on WB, both 
valuated at the social optimal traffic flow.  This determines the optimal toll and toll revenue on 
the congested roads (AU or WB), which equal to 
2
k a Toll − =  
4
) ( Re
2e k a venue − =  
Therefore, to reach a social optimal solution and solve the Braess traffic paradox, a toll of the 
above amount should be charged on every commuter who is using the causeway and thus making 
both segments of AU and WB more congested.  By charging such a toll, travel externality will be 
internalized and some of the commuters will be discouraged to use the causeway, making the 
transportation system efficient. 
 
4. Discussions and Conclusions 
  18This paper has illustrated that highway investment and expansion may not always help to 
mitigate traffic congestions and reduce travel time as intuitively suggested.   Specifically, we 
presented three cases under which highway expansion or construction cannot reduce or even 
increase travel time by attracting more users from uncongested route or public transit.  First, as 
the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox states, adding a bridge to a road system does not reduce travel 
time.  This occurs because traffic may simply shift to the bridge from the uncongested route, 
making the bridge more congested.   Second, as the Downs-Thompson paradox states, increasing 
road capacity on a private car route can actually make overall congestion on the road worse.  
This occurs when commuters shift from public transport that exhibits economies of scale to 
private car that causes negative traffic externality.  Third, as the Braess paradox states, adding 
extra capacity to a network, when the moving entities selfishly choose their route, can in some 
cases reduce overall performance and increase the total commuting time.  In all three cases, 
commuters make decisions based on their private average cost and in equilibrium all routes or 
modes have the same average travel time. 
The paper has shown that the above traffic paradoxes can be solved if traffic externality is 
internalized and commuters are distributed by minimizing the total social travel cost.  Put it 
differently, adding road capacity will reduce commuting cost when travel decisions are made 
based on marginal social cost instead of private average cost.  In order to reach the social 
optimal, a toll needs to be charged on commuters who are travel on congested routes.  The 
amount of toll is determined by the difference between social marginal cost and private average 
cost at the social optimal traffic volume.  For all three cases discussed above, this papers has 
derived the optimal tolls and toll revenues.   
Strong policy implications can be drawn. First of all, what Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox 
  19really means is that a construction of new highway segment under uncongested transportation 
network or an expansion of congested segments with uncongested alternative routes contributes 
little to traffic time reduction under the equilibrium condition.  Therefore, expansion of 
uncongested highway network is economically unjustified.  However, congestion pricing will 
produce different results. Unlike equilibrium choice, congestion pricing will justify an expansion 
of congested segments for traffic time reduction.  This is because congestion pricing yields 
optimal allocation of traffics by internalizing congestion externality.  Secondly, what Downs-
Thomson paradox really means is that under equilibrium condition, highway construction will 
cause more traffic times by realigning traffic distribution between highway users and transit 
riders as long as there are at least one people uses transit. Therefore, highway expansion to 
promote private car uses is an inefficient strategy.  Again, congestion pricing can justify highway 
expansion that will reduce traffic times under optimal allocation of traffic volume.  Thus, 
highway expansion, transit development and pricing should all be integrated parts of 
transportation development strategy.  Finally, what Braess paradox really suggests is that 
construction of highway segments should be carefully determined in terms of layouts and 
connectivity.  Otherwise, highway construction may not mitigate traffic condition under the 
equilibrium condition.  Congestion pricing, like the above two cases, will ensure additional road 
capacity to reduce travel time.  It should be pointed that policy implications of our analyses 
should be cautiously interpreted, mainly because that traffic time, instead of costs, is used in our 
analysis.  This is particularly important for traffic allocation between private car users and public 
transit riders since costs are primary consideration for transit users.  
Finally, this paper has demonstrated the need for comprehensive transportation 
development and planning strategy that should include highway expansion, new construction, 
  20public transit users and pricing mechanism to better address urban traffic.  Solely relying on 
highway construction may be counter-productive in terms of traffic congestion.  Often, it is more 
effective if policies are made by considering commuter economic behavior and using pricing 
mechanism.  To mitigate urban traffic congestion, both supply-side and demand-side policies 
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